I have published on a range of topics in ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and the history of philosophy.
Some of my papers are available in final draft form through the Open Access Repository at Victoria University Wellington. If you would like to read any of my papers but can't get access online, email me.
Some of my papers are available in final draft form through the Open Access Repository at Victoria University Wellington. If you would like to read any of my papers but can't get access online, email me.
Mental Health
‘Mental Health in Old Age,’ in C. S. Wareham (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of the Ethics of Ageing (Cambridge University Press, 2022) pp. 79-91.
What does mental health have to do with well-being? Bioethics 34:3 (2020): 228-234.
I am presently working on some papers and hopefully a book about the idea of mental health; you can see a very brief statement of some of my views here.
What does mental health have to do with well-being? Bioethics 34:3 (2020): 228-234.
I am presently working on some papers and hopefully a book about the idea of mental health; you can see a very brief statement of some of my views here.
special relationships in ethics and politics
I explore the ethical dimensions of various personal and political relationships. My overall view is that there is no virtue of loyalty (though some kinds of loyalty can be virtuous) and that relationships with particular individuals have an ethical significance that collective and political relationships lack. Along the way, I argue that patriotism is a vice, that good friendship can involve biased belief, that grown children have duties to their parents, and that countries cannot share friendships. Much of this work is in my book The Limits of Loyalty. In my more recent book, Partiality, I offer a general theory of the ethics of special relationships, arguing that the grounds for special treatment within special relationships lie in the self-standing value of individual persons.
Here is my inaugural lecture at Victoria University Wellington, on the ethics of patriotism.
Here is a public lecture I gave at University of Melbourne, on war and patriotism.
Sarah Stroud and I talk about our views of the ethics of partiality on Philosophy TV.
Niko Kolodny and I talk about our views about love and morality on bloggingheads.tv.
Here is my inaugural lecture at Victoria University Wellington, on the ethics of patriotism.
Here is a public lecture I gave at University of Melbourne, on war and patriotism.
Sarah Stroud and I talk about our views of the ethics of partiality on Philosophy TV.
Niko Kolodny and I talk about our views about love and morality on bloggingheads.tv.
Welfare and welfarism
I have a number of papers about the nature of individual welfare - what does it mean for an individual's life to go well? - and the importance of welfare for questions in ethics and political philosophy. I offer a subjectivist account of welfare, on which welfare consists in success according to the standards constitutively set by certain attitudes (standards like truth of beliefs and achievement of goals). I also say that welfare has multiple irreducible dimensions, and that the project of grounding all of ethics in considerations of welfare is more promising than most people think. Some sample papers:
‘Posthumous Harm,’ in Stephen Luper (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death (Cambridge University Press, 2014) pp. 181-197.
‘Welfare as Success,’ Nous 43:4 (2009): 656-683.
‘Welfarism,’ Philosophy Compass 4:1 (2009): 82-95.
‘Expensive Tastes and Distributive Justice,’ Social Theory and Practice 28:4 (2002): 529-552.
‘Posthumous Harm,’ in Stephen Luper (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death (Cambridge University Press, 2014) pp. 181-197.
‘Welfare as Success,’ Nous 43:4 (2009): 656-683.
‘Welfarism,’ Philosophy Compass 4:1 (2009): 82-95.
‘Expensive Tastes and Distributive Justice,’ Social Theory and Practice 28:4 (2002): 529-552.
PHILOSOPHY OF TIME
I have two papers on presentism, one examining the problems presentists face in accounting for past- and future-tensed truths; and one, co-authored with Michael Nelson, arguing that if time travel is possible on an eternalist picture, then it is possible on a presentist picture too.
‘Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel,’ (co-authored with Michael Nelson) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:3 (2001): 333-345.
‘Presentism and Truthmaking,’ in Dean Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. I (Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 83-104.
‘Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel,’ (co-authored with Michael Nelson) Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79:3 (2001): 333-345.
‘Presentism and Truthmaking,’ in Dean Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. I (Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 83-104.